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Abstract—The paper presents a general framework for im-
proving the security of the cryptosystem based on the sym-
metric block cipher. The main idea is based on possibil-
ity of chancing substitution boxes (called S-boxes) in encryp-
tion/decryption algorithm. In order to make it possible, it is
necessary to generate identical boxes by an encryption and
decryption party. This is the main reason, why deterministic
methods of generating substitution boxes based on the pseu-
dorandom sequences will be presented.
Keywords— block cipher, cryptosystem, permutation box
(P-box), (pseudo)random bit generator, substitution box (S-box).
1. Introduction
The conﬁdentiality of the information, transmitted via con-
temporary telecommunications systems, is ensured by cryp-
tographic devices. In such devices a cryptosystem is imple-
mented, which provides conﬁdentiality using cryptographic
ciphers. The cryptosystem (Fig. 1) is deﬁned as a quintuple
(PT, CT, K, Ek, Dk), where: PT - plaintext, CT – cipher-
text, K – key, EK – encryption algorithm, DK – decryption
algorithm, such that:
CT = EK(PT) ,
PT = DK(CT) = DK(EK(PT)) .
Fig. 1. Cryptosystem.
As an encryption/decryption algorithm the block cipher
can be used. A lot of modern block ciphers are built
using Shannon’s concept [1], which uses two basic trans-
formations: confusion and diﬀusion. Such product cipher
uses S-boxes that provide confusions and P-boxes that pro-
vide diﬀusions and spread out the output bits to diﬀerent
S-boxes of the next round. Simple substitution and trans-
position transformations individually do not provide a very
high level of security. However, by combining these trans-
formations it is possible to obtain strong product cipher,
which guarantees resistance against linear and diﬀerential
cryptanalysis. The strength of such cipher mainly comes
from the property of S-boxes. It is well known that weak-
nesses of substitution boxes may be compensated for by the
increased number of rounds. Another way to improve secu-
rity of such cryptosystem is possibility of changing S-boxes
in the product cipher.
The S-box S : Zn2 → Zm2 is a nonlinear transformation witch
transforms the n-binary sequence to the m-binary sequence.
They can be constant (generated at the stage of speciﬁca-
tion and used during the lifetime of algorithm, e.g., Data
Encryption Standard, Advanced Encryption Standard) or
variable (generated before a session on the basis of data,
which are available to the encryption/decryption party and
used during the session). The idea of improving the se-
curity of cryptosystem based on the replacement S-boxes
in the encryption/decryption algorithm by new generated
S-boxes. This causes, that for the same plaintext and main
key, we obtain diﬀerent ciphertext. We can say that we have
another block cipher. The changing of S-boxes prevents
from receiving enough information to execute the eﬀective
cryptanalytical attack.
So the main question is how to change S-boxes without
delivering them to the cryptographic devices. The answer
is really simple. The encryption/decryption party has to
generate identical substitution boxes, which will be used
in the encryption/decryption process. Therefore determin-
istic methods of generating S-boxes using pseudorandom
sequences are proposed. The encryption and decryption
party has to have the same parameters of the generation
process, for example, the seed and the algebraic module,
so that it can generate identical sequences. Using these se-
quences and presented in Section 2 methods, it is possible
to generate identical S-boxes, which can be change in the
block cipher.
S-boxes, which can be applied in the block cipher, should
fulﬁll the cryptographical criterion like balancedness, non-
linearity, strict avalanche criterion. The article proposes two
algorithms of generation good cryptographically S-boxes
using pseudorandom sequences. The generated S-boxes
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will be checked towards their nonlinearity (called nl) and
distance to strict avalanche criterion (called dSAC).
2. The S-Box Generation Method Using
Binary Sequence
The analysis of opportunities of replacement substitution
boxes in block ciphers was preceded by analysis of gen-
eration them using binary sequence. With this view two
constructions are proposed which allow generating truth
table of the S-box S : Zn2 → Zm2 from binary sequence [2].
Construction 1
Let Z = (z0, z1, z2, . . . , zr−1), zi ∈ Z2, be a binary se-
quence. Using this sequence we construct m-binary vec-
tors: z0 = (z0, . . . , zm−1), z1 = (zm, . . . ,z2m−1), . . . ,zk =
(zkm, . . . ,z(k+1)m−1), zi ∈ Z
m
2 . The ﬁrst nonzero vector
zl = (zlm, . . . , z(l+1)m−1) is the ﬁrst row in the generated
truth table. The next vectors zl+1, zl+2, . . . are checked if
they are diﬀerent from the vectors in the truth table. In the
case of the positive veriﬁcation such a vector is the next
row in truth table, otherwise the vector is omitted and the
next vector is checked. The process is continued until the
truth table is full.
Algorithm 1: Algorithm of S-box S : Zn2 → Zm2 generation
using Construction 1
Input: Z = (z0, z1, z2, . . . , zr−1),
zi ∈ Z2 – the binary sequence,
Output: Sb = [s0, s1, . . . , s2n−1] – the S-box table.
l := 0;
repeat
Sb[0] := 0;
for j := 0 to m−1 do
Sb[0] := Sb[0]+ zl ·2 j;
l := l + 1;
until Sb[0] 6= 0;
for i = 1 to 2n−1 do
repeat
Sb[i] := 0;
for j := 0 to m−1 do
Sb[i] := Sb[i]+ zl ·2 j;
l := l + 1;
if (Sb[i] ∈ {s0 . . .si−1}) then spr := 1,
otherwise spr := 0;
until spr = 0;
Construction 2
Let: Z0 = (z00, z
0
1, . . . , z
0
r−1), z
0
i ∈ Z2,
Z1 = (z10, z11, . . . , z1r−1), z1i ∈ Z2, . . . ,
Zm−1 = (zm−10 , z
m−1
1 , . . . , z
m−1
r−1 ), z
m−1
i ∈ Z2,
be m random sequences.
Using them we construct m-binary vectors in the following
way: z0 = (z
0
0, z
1
0, . . . , z
m−1
0 ), z1 = (z
0
1, z
1
1, . . . , z
m−1
1 ), . . . ,
zk = (z
0
k , z
1
k , . . . , z
m−1
k ), zi ∈ Z
m
2 . The ﬁrst nonzero vector
zl = (z
0
l , z
1
l , . . . , z
m−1
l ) is the ﬁrst row in the generated truth
table. The next vectors zl+1, zl+2, . . . are checked if they
are diﬀerent from the vectors in the truth table. In the case
of the positive veriﬁcation such vector is the next row in
the truth table, otherwise the vector is omitted and the next
vector is checked. The process is continued until the truth
table is full.
Algorithm 2: Algorithm of S-box S : Zn2 → Zm2 generation
using Construction 2
Input: Z0 = (z00, z
0
1, . . . , z
0
r−1),
Z1 = (z10, z
1
1, . . . , z
1
r−1), . . . ,
Zm−1 = (zm−10 , z
m−1
1 , . . . , z
m−1
r−1 ),
z ji ∈ Z2 – binary sequences,
Output: Sb = [s0, s1, . . . , s2n−1] – the S-box table.
l := 0;
repeat
Sb[0] := 0;
for j := 0 to m−1 do
Sb[0] := Sb[0]+ z jl ·2 j;
l := l + 1;
until Sb[0] 6= 0;
for i = 1 to 2n−1 do
repeat
Sb[i] := 0;
for j := 0 to m−1 do
Sb[i] := Sb[i]+ z jl ·2 j;
l := l + 1;
if (Sb[i] ∈ {s0 . . . si−1}) then spr := 1,
otherwise spr := 0;
until spr = 0;
The presented above methods were implemented. Gener-
ated S-boxes were veriﬁed towards their nonlinearity end
strict avalanche criterion.
3. Generation S-Boxes Using Random
Binary Sequence
The random numbers play a crucial part in cryptography.
They are used in many cryptographical applications and
devices and may be generated exclusively by hardware bi-
nary sequence generator, for example SGCL-1 [3], which
was designed in Military Communication Institute. Us-
ing this generator and proposed method 1000000 S-boxes
S : Z82 → Z82 were generated. They were tested towards their
nonlinearity and strict avalanche criterion. The number of
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S-boxes depending on nonlinearity and distance to SAC was
shown in Tables 1 and 2, and was illustrated in Figs. 2–5.
Table 1
The results of the nonlinearity test of S-boxes generated
using random binary sequence
S-box nl(S) Construction 1 Construction 2
S : Z82 → Z82
70 0 1
72 1 0
74 1 0
76 4 3
78 25 25
80 153 175
82 699 666
84 2849 2874
86 11420 11380
88 41955 41527
90 132211 131664
92 313810 314461
94 385570 386342
96 109767 109350
98 1535 1532
Table 2
The results of the distance to SAC test of S-boxes
generated using random binary sequence
S-box dSAC(S) Construction 1 Construction 2
S : Z82 → Z82
32 6359 6303
36 228686 228574
40 459965 460667
44 227993 227715
48 61804 61624
52 12644 12608
56 2190 2144
60 307 318
64 44 41
68 6 5
72 1 1
76 1 0
Fig. 2. The number of S-boxes generated using random binary
sequence depending on the nonlinearity.
Fig. 3. The number of S-boxes generated using random binary
sequence depending on the distance to SAC.
The maximum value of the nonlinearity is 98 and it is
achieved in 0.1535% (Construction 1) and 0.1532% (Con-
struction 2) generated S-boxes. The nonlinearity, which ac-
complishes the maximum number of S-boxes is equal 94
and it is achieved in 38.5570% (Construction 1) and
38.6342 (Construction 2) S-boxes.
Fig. 4. The percent estimation of the number of S-boxes gener-
ated using random binary sequence depending on the nonlinearity
(Construction 1). The value in parentheses speciﬁes the nonlin-
earity of S-boxes.
The minimum value of the dSAC is 32 and it is achieved
in 0.6359% (Construction 1) and 0.6303% (Construction 2)
generated S-boxes. The dSAC, which accomplishes the
maximum number of S-boxes is equal 40 and it is achieved
in 45.9965% (Construction 1) and 46.0667 (Construction 2)
S-boxes.
If we assume that “good” S-box should have nonlinearity at
the level of 90 and dSAC at more than 48 then the proba-
bility, that generated S-box will satisfy above-mentioned
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Fig. 5. The percent estimation of the number of S-boxes gener-
ated using random binary sequence depending on the nonlinearity
(Construction 2). The value in parentheses speciﬁes the nonlin-
earity of S-boxes.
assumptions, is very high and is equal 0.9286 for both
constructions.
4. Generation S-Boxes Using
Pseudorandom Bit Sequence
The pseudorandom numbers play an important part in
cryptography, too. They are used in many cryptograph-
ical applications and devices and may be generated by
pseudorandom generators, for example, Legendre’s gener-
ator [4], [5], BBS generator [4], inverse generator [4] and
so on. The pseudorandom sequence generators are com-
posed as linear or nonlinear. In cryptography nonlinear
pseudorandom generators are used because of character-
istics like:
– deterministic method of generating sequences – this
feature allows to generate the same sequence by in-
dependent computation party;
– improvement of quality generated sequences;
– nonlinearity of the generated sequence – very im-
portant feature, as S-boxes should have high nonlin-
earity, so they should be generated using nonlinear
sequences.
The Legendre’s generator is deﬁned in the following way.
Let p be an odd prime number then Xn−1 if n jest quadratic
residue modulo p and Xn = 0 otherwise, where n takes
following natural value. The Legendre’s sequences satisfy
Golomb’s postulates [6].
Using Legendre’s generator and proposed constructions
1000000 S-boxes S : Z82 → Z82 were generated. They were
tested towards their nonlinearity and strict avalanche cri-
terion. The number of S-boxes depending on nonlinearity
and distance to SAC was showed in Tables 3 and 4, and
illustrated in Figs. 6–9.
Table 3
The results of the nonlinearity test of S-boxes generated
using pseudorandom Legendre’s sequence
S-box nl(S) Construction 1 Construction 2
S : Z82 → Z82
74 2 0
76 6 3
78 28 39
80 156 143
82 666 643
84 2816 2942
86 11295 11430
88 41727 41761
90 131692 132081
92 314333 314254
94 385979 384790
96 109769 110420
98 1531 1494
Table 4
The results of the distance to SAC test of S-boxes
generated using pseudorandom Legendre’s sequence
S-box dSAC(S) Construction 1 Construction 2
S : Z82 → Z82
28 1 1
32 6254 6169
36 229105 228828
40 459813 460664
44 228003 228002
48 61710 61344
52 12628 12547
56 2095 2079
60 341 315
64 42 48
68 8 3
Fig. 6. The number of S-boxes generated using pseudorandom
Legendre’s sequence depending on the nonlinearity.
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The maximum value of the nonlinearity is 98 and it is
achieved in 0.1531% (Construction 1) and 0.1494% (Con-
struction 2) generated S-boxes. The nonlinearity, which
accomplishes the maximum number of S-boxes is equal 94
and achieves it 38.5979% (Construction 1) and 38.4790
(Construction 2) S-boxes.
Fig. 7. The number of S-boxes generated using pseudorandom
Legendre’s sequence depending on the distance to SAC.
The minimum value of the distance to the strict avalanche
criterion is 28 and it is achieved in 0.0001% (both con-
structions) generated S-boxes. The dSAC, which accom-
plishes the maximum number of S-boxes is equal 40 and
it is achieved in 45.9813% (Construction 1) and 46.0664
(Construction 2) S-boxes.
Fig. 8. The percent estimation of the number of S-boxes gener-
ated using pseudorandom Legendre’s sequence depending on the
nonlinearity (Construction 1). The value in parentheses speciﬁes
the nonlinearity of S-boxes.
If we assume that “good” S-box should have nonlinearity
at least the level of 90 and dSAC at more than 48 then the
probability, that generated S-box will satisfy above-men-
Fig. 9. The percent estimation of the number of S-boxes gener-
ated using pseudorandom Legendre’s sequence depending on the
nonlinearity (Construction 2). The value in parentheses speciﬁes
the nonlinearity of S-boxes.
tioned assumptions, is very high and is equal 0.9290 (Con-
struction 1) and 0.9289 (Construction 2).
5. The Method of Improving the
Security of the Cryptosystem Based
on the Block Cipher
The idea of improving the security of cryptosystem based
on block cipher depends on replacement of substitution
boxes in the encryption/decryption algorithm. So that, it
would be possible, the encryption and decryption party
have to generate identical S-boxes for the cryptographic
session. These possibilities are given by the method of
generating S-boxes from pseudorandom sequences, because
the encryption/decryption party can generate identical bits
streams and as a result thanks to proposed method – iden-
tical S-boxes. With this view we can apply the following
method based on the Diﬃe-Hellman protocol [6] to arrange
the seed:
1) the encryption/decryption party has to have identical
numbers g, m;
2) the encryption party chooses a number: 1 < x < m−1
and calculates: X = gx mod m;
3) the decryption party chooses a number: 1 < y < m−1
and calculates: Y = gy mod m;
4) the encryption/decryption party exchanges numbers
X and Y ;
5) the encryption/decryption party calculates the seed:
sencr = Y x mod m ;
sdecr = X y mod m ,
s = sencr = sdecr = gxy mod m .
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The encryption/decryption party using the seed s and
module m generates Legendre’s sequence and then sub-
stitution boxes. The generated S-boxes should characterize
high nonlinearity (at least nlmin) and low dSAC (at most
dSACmax), so the algorithm of generation of such S-boxes
is as follow.
Algorithm 3: Algorithm of S-box table generation
Input: nlmin – the minimal value of the nonlinearity of
the generated S-boxes;
dSACmax – the maximal value of the dSAC of the
generated S-boxes;
Output: T SB = [SB0,SB1, . . . ,SBr−1] – the table of
S-boxes.
for i := 0 to r−1 do
repeat
SBi := SbGen;
// SbGen – a S-box generation algorithm
using Constr. 1 or Constr. 2;
nl := Licz Nl(SBi);
// Licz Nl – a nonlinearity of the S-box
calculation algorithm;
dsac := Licz dSAC(SBi);
// Licz dSAC – an dSAC of the S-box
calculation algorithm;
until (nl ≥ nlmin and sac≤ dSACmax);
The exchanging of the S-boxes in block ciphers causes that
a diﬀerent block cipher is applied in the cryptosystem. This
makes impossible to collect suﬃcient amount of informa-
tion to carry back the cryptanalytical attack and in conse-
quence raises the security of cryptosystem.
6. Conclusions
The sequences generated by the Legendre’s generator sat-
isfy statistical tests described in Federal Information Pro-
cessing Standards Publications (FIPS 140-1), have statisti-
cal characteristic like random sequences and are strongly
nonlinear. For this reason they carry out experiments of
making substitution boxes using the proposed method and
Legendre’s sequences. The researches of nonlinearity and
dSAC of generated S-boxes show that, giving the max-
imum nonlinearity and minimum dSAC up, it is possi-
ble to generate “good” S-boxes. It gives the possibility
of making S-boxes used in block ciphers and makes them
replaceable. This treatment secures cryptosystems against
many cryptographical attacks, especially diﬀerential and
algebraic cryptanalysis.
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